A secure data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth – Bloom secret sharing by I. M., Yusuf et al.
A secure data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom secret 
sharing 
Yusuf  I. M.1, Mustafa Kaiiali1, Adib Habbal2, Wazan A. S.3, Auwal S. I.1 
1Department of Computer Engineering, Mevlana University, Konya, Turkey 
idrisawaa@gmail.com, mkaiiali@mevlana.edu.tr, engrausan@gmail.com 
2 InterNetWorks Research Lab, School of Computing, 
Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 UUM Sintok, Kedah Malaysia 
adib@uum.edu.my 
3 Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse(irit), France 
ahmad-samer.wazan@irit.fr 
  
A secure data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom secret 
sharing 
Data outsourcing is an emerging paradigm for data management in which a 
database is provided as a service by third party service providers. One of the major 
benefits of offering database as a service is to provide organizations, which are 
unable to purchase expensive hardware and software to host their databases, with 
efficient data storage accessible online at a cheap rate. Despite that, several issues 
of data confidentiality, integrity, availability and efficient indexing of users’ 
queries at the server side have to be addressed in the data outsourcing paradigm. 
Service providers have to guarantee that their clients’ data is secured against 
internal (insider) and external attacks. This paper briefly analyses the existing 
indexing schemes in data outsourcing and highlights their advantages and 
disadvantages. Then it proposes a secure data outsourcing scheme based on 
Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing which tries to address the issues in data outsourcing 
such as data confidentiality, availability and order preservation for efficient 
indexing.  
Keywords: data outsourcing; indexing; secret sharing.  
Introduction 
The rapid increase in the amount of data held by organizations has drastically increased 
the cost of in-house data management. Services providers that share resources across 
different organizations are therefore required in order to reduce the cost [1]. In-house data 
management cost was estimated to be 5-10 times higher than the initial acquisition cost 
[2]. 
Despite the economic advantage of data outsourcing, it faces a lot of challenges 
to get widespread acceptance [3]. Data owners are cautious to place their secret 
information under the control of a third party without the guarantee of having an efficient 
and robust service that manages the information in a secure and privacy preserving 
manner. Studies have shown that users’ secret information stored at the premises of 
service providers is susceptible to insider attacks; for example employees of online social 
network can know which profiles a user has visited [4]. Some may sell their users data to 
third party companies who can use them for commercial purposes [5]. In addition, 
governments may have a direct access to users’ private information through collaboration 
with service providers, as revealed in 2013 by one of the NSA contractors Edward 
Snowden [6, 7]. For data outsourcing to take over in-house data management, these issues 
have to be adequately addressed. 
The prominent techniques used in securing outsourced data are Data encryption 
[8], Homomorphic encryption [9], Secret Sharing algorithms and Private Information 
Retrieval (PIR) [10]. 
Encryption has been a traditional solution to the issue of confidentiality. However, 
performing database manipulations operations such as insert, update, delete and query on 
an outsourced encrypted data imposes an extra overhead due to the several encryption 
and decryption processes that need to take place at the client side [11-14]. 
In homomorphic encryption, data processing operations are performed on an 
encrypted outsourced data at the server side while the client only verifies the correctness 
of the answer without spending much computational effort [15]. This reduces the 
overhead of encryption and decryption processes that have to be performed at the client 
side. However, homomorphic encryption is considered to be computationally expensive 
due to its dependence on public key cryptosystems [10]. 
Apart from data confidentiality, another important issue is data availability. 
“Downtime can cripple work flow and impose substantial cost - from time and money 
spent on repairs to lapses in productivity to the inability to meet service levels and 
compliance mandates” [16]. Data availability is usually achieved by duplicating the data 
and storing it at different servers [10]. Secret sharing schemes and Information Dispersal 
Algorithms (IDAs) [17] are used to provide data availability. 
Secret sharing [18] refers to a method of distributing a secret to a group of 
participants each of whom is allocated a share of the secret [19]. There are several types 
of secret sharing schemes. The most basic types are the threshold schemes, where only 
the cardinality of the set of shares matters [19, 20]. In other words, given a secret S, 
and n shares, any set of t out of n shares is a set with the smallest cardinality from which 
the secret can be recovered [21], in the sense that any set of (t-1) shares is not enough to 
give S. This is known as a threshold access structure and is also known as (t, n) 
threshold secret sharing scheme [22]. Several secret sharing schemes have been 
employed in [2, 10, 23] to provide data availability for outsourced data. 
In PIR protocols, the queries performed by the client on the database are hidden 
from the service provider. One trivial but inefficient way to achieve PIR is for the server 
to send the entire encrypted database to the client. Then the client has to decrypt and 
execute the query locally. This provides privacy but introduces communication latency 
and computational overhead on the client especially for large databases [24]. 
Due to this, many approaches were designed to enable an efficient execution of 
different types of queries on an encrypted data e.g. encryption based indexing [8], 
homomorphic encryption [9], partition based indexing [25], hash based indexing [26],  
B+ tree indexing [25], and order preservation encryption [27] (order preservation is a very 
important aspect in a data outsourcing scenario, in order to  support comparison 
operations to be directly applied on encrypted/shared data at the server side without the 
need to retrieve and decrypt it at the client side). 
Apart from providing data as a service, the data outsourcing model has been 
incorporated in many real-time applications to solve users’ privacy issues.  As an 
example, several data outsourcing paradigms have been proposed to address the privacy 
issue that exists in Online Social Networks [28, 29] such as flyByNight [5], faceCloak 
[30] and Cloud-based OSN projects [31].  
 This paper proposes a new data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom 
Secret Sharing (ABSS) [32]. ABSS is a threshold scheme based on the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem. It requires O(r) modular operations to recover a shared data as 
compared with other secret sharing schemes such as Shamir Secret Sharing which is 
sensitive to error and uses an interpolation formula that requires O(rlog2r) operations. 
ABSS is secure in the sense that no useful information can be recovered out of (r - 1) 
shares. ABSS can be modified to include the option of checking the validity of the shared 
outsourced data before recovery [32]. For the previously mentioned advantages of ABSS, 
this paper proposes a new data outsourcing scheme based on ABSS that addresses several 
security challenges existing in data outsourcing, namely, availability, confidentiality and 
order preservation efficiently. There are other schemes that offer one [8, 9] or two [19, 
21] of these characteristics, however, our proposed scheme supports all three 
characteristics in an efficient and computationally less expensive manner. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the data 
outsourcing model. Section III gives a detailed review of related work. Section IV 
discusses the secret sharing scheme using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Section 
V presents a direct implementation of the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme in data 
outsourcing. In Section VI, an enhanced data outsourcing model based on the Asmuth-
Bloom secret sharing scheme is proposed. Then, Section VII presents a security analysis 
of the proposed scheme. Finally, the paper concludes in Section VIII. 
Data outsourcing model 
A data outsourcing model [34] consists of the following entities depicted in Figure 1. 
 Data owner: the entity that owns the data and wishes to outsource it. 
 User: an entity that needs to access the outsourced data published by the data 
owner. 
 Service provider: an entity that stores and manages the outsourced data. 
 Client: the only party trusted by all the entities involved in a data outsourcing 
scenario. The client transforms queries presented by users into equivalent queries 
that operate on the encrypted database stored on the server side. 
The data owner and the clients rely upon the service provider for the availability 
of the outsourced data. However, the confidentiality of the outsourced data is not trusted 
with the service provider as it may contain sensitive information that the data owner needs 
to reveal only to authorized users. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent the service 
provider from having unauthorized access to the outsourced data.  
 
Figure 1: Data outsourcing model 
The Figure above illustrates how the data outsourcing model works. The data 
owner encrypts his/her data and outsources it to the third party service provider where it 
will be stored and managed in an encrypted form. Whenever a user wants to access the 
outsourced data, he/she sends his/her query to the client where it will be transformed to a 
corresponding query that can work on the encrypted data at the server side. The server 
then responds to the request and sends the encrypted result back to the client, where it 
will be decrypted, further processed and finally sent to the user. 
Related works 
A lot of techniques were designed to support queries on encrypted relational databases 
and to protect the outsourced database against compromises in confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. However, some of these techniques have certain limitations which make 
them inefficient. 
The table below illustrates a simple database example used throughout this paper. 
It is a database of employees’ information. The data owner may outsource this database 
to multiple Data Service Providers (DSPj). 
Table 1: Employees’ table 
S/N Fname Salary 
1 Alicia 10 
2 Bob 18 
3 Carol 21 
4 Danna 36 
5 Ebe 67 
6 Frank 69 
7 Gabza 71 
8 Habu 81 
9 Ibro 93 
10 Joseph 238 
Encryption based indexing approach 
Database encryption refers to the use of encryption techniques to transform a plaintext 
database into an encrypted database, thus making it unreadable to anyone except those 
who possess the decryption key [8]. 
Encryption protects the exposure of sensitive information even if the server is 
compromised, and ensures its integrity since data tampering can be detected. Data 
decryption cannot be executed at the server side, therefore solutions have been developed 
that allow the server to execute queries directly on the encrypted data [12]. 
In [8], an encryption approach is employed in which the attributes of the relation 
are encrypted and used as an index. The index value Ii[j] associated with the attribute 
value ai[j] in tuple j is computed as Ek(ai[j]), where Ek is a conventional encryption 
function and k is the encryption key.  
The advantages of this approach are: 
 It supports the confidentiality service. 
 It supports equality. As an example, searching for a tuple in an outsourced 
encrypted data whose attribute a1 value in Table 1 is equal to 10 will be directly 
translated by the client into searching for a tuple in the encrypted relation whose  
I1 value is equal to Ek(10) [25]. 
The limitations of this approach are: 
 It does not support range queries because conventional encryption need not be 
order preserving [27]. 
 It does not support availability. 
Homomorphic encryption 
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows mathematical operations to 
be performed on encrypted data without compromising the encryption, and the result 
when decrypted should match the operations on the plaintext. 
Homomorphic encryption is desirable in modern communication system 
architectures especially in Cloud Computing [8]. This is because it can allow the chaining 
of different services together without exposing the data to each of those services [35]. For 
example, a chain of different services from different companies could be: calculate the 
tax, the currency exchange rate and the shipping. All of these services are needed within 
a single transaction without exposing the unencrypted data to any of them [36]. This 
feature makes this scheme good in providing confidentiality of an outsourced data, though 
it does not preserve its order due to the encryption process. 
In [9], a privacy homomorphic encryption that allows basic arithmetic operations 
to be performed over encrypted data is employed. In this scheme two functions α and β 
are defined over the domains of unencrypted and encrypted values respectively. If A is a 
domain of unencrypted values, Ek is an encryption function with key k, and Dk is the 
corresponding decryption function, then (Ek, Dk, α, β) can be defined as a privacy 
homomorphism if: 
Dk( βi ( Ek(a1), Ek(a2), …, Ek(an))) = αi (a1, a2,…, am): 1≤ i ≤ n 
To add two values a1 and a2 which are encrypted and stored at the server side the 
system goes through the following steps; assuming Ek(ai) = ( ai mod p, ai mod q) while 
(p, q) are prime numbers representing the shared secret key k between owner and client): 
 Compute n = p.q, where n is a public parameter.  
 The server is instructed to compute Ek(a1) + Ek(a2) and then return the result to 
the client 
 The client decrypts the result using the function: (d1qq-1+d2pp-1) (mod n), where 
d1 = a1 (mod p), d2 = a2 (mod q), qq
-1 = 1(mod p) and pp-1 = 1(mod q). 
As an example, if k = (p = 5, q = 7) and a1 = 10, a2 = 18 are two salaries of two 
different employees (as shown in Table 1) ⇒ Ek(a1) = (10 mod 5, 10 mod 7) = (0, 3) and 
Ek(a2) = (18 mod 5, 18 mod 7) = (3, 4). To add a1 and a2 stored encrypted at the server: 
 n = p.q = 5 × 7 = 35 
 E(a1)+E(a2) = (0+3, 3+4) = (3, 7) 
 The client finally decrypt the result using the function (d1qq-1+d2pp-1) (mod n) = 
(3×7×3 + 7×5×3) mod (35) = 168 mod 35 = 28 which is the addition of a1 to a2. 
The advantages of homomorphic encryption are: 
 It supports confidentiality. 
 It supports equality, aggregation and logical operations on the outsourced data [9]. 
The limitations of this approach are: 
 It is computationally expensive due to its dependence on PKI [10]. 
 It does not preserve the order of the outsourced data so it cannot execute range 
queries. 
 It does not support the availability service. 
Partitioned based indexing approach 
In this approach the attribute domain Di is partitioned into contiguous subsets of values 
of the same size without overlapping. Each partition is augmented with a label in an 
ordered or random manner in the domain Di.  
 In [25], an architecture is proposed based on a partition based indexing approach. 
It comprises of three entities: a user, a server and a client (similar to Figure 1). A user 
poses a query to a client to transform it to an equivalent query that can run on encrypted 
data at the server side. The encrypted database is augmented with an index to make the 
encrypted data queryable. Based on the index, a technique is developed to split the user’s 
query over encrypted data into 2 queries; a server query runs on the encrypted data and a 
client query runs on the client side to post-process the results obtained from the server 
query. To split the query, three functions are introduced: a partitioning function, an 
identification function and a mapping function. 
 The partition function splits the domain values of attributes into partitions of equal 
length using a histogram construction technique (e.g. MaxDiff [37] or equi-depth 
[38]) such that it covers the whole domain. 
 The identification function assigns a unique identifier to each of these partitions. 
To avoid collisions, a collision free hash function can be used for this purpose. 
 The mapping function maps each of the partitions to its identifier. 
The advantages of this approach are: 
 It supports the confidentiality service. 
 It allows server evaluation of the equality condition [34]. 
 The partitioning of the domain values into contiguous subsets makes it possible 
to partially preserve the order of the outsourced data [34]. 
The limitations of this approach are:   
 It can produce spurious tuples. Spurious tuples are tuples that satisfy the 
correspondent query condition over the indexes of the outsourced data but do not 
satisfy the query condition over the original plaintext [34]. These spurious tuples 
need to be further processed and eliminated at the client side. 
 It partially supports range queries [34]. 
 It does not support availability. 
Hash based indexing 
The hash based indexing technique uses as an index the result of a secure hash function 
over the attribute values of a relation. The hash function can be adapted for different 
granularities of the presented data. As an example if the co-domain C of the hash function 
is small compared to the number of attribute values, the hash function distributes the 
tuples uniformly in |C| buckets. 
With respect to direct encryption, hash based indexing provides more 
confidentiality, however, it does not preserve the order of the outsourced data. When 
hashing is used, different plaintext values are mapped onto the same index, so the query 
results often produce spurious tuples that need to be further processed by the client [26]. 
As an example, consider the relation in Table 2 of an encrypted employee table 
Employeek. The indexes of the attributes Fname and Salary in relation Employee (shown 
in Table 1) are computed by applying the hash-based method. Three distinct values 
namely α, β and γ have been mapped to the values of the attribute Fname while four 
distinct values 𝜖, 𝜃, 𝜙 and 𝜎 have been mapped to the values of the attribute Salary. 
Table 2: Employeek 
S/N Encrypted tuple Index1 Index2 
1 tyuR34+pcn α 𝜖 
2 Kljm$=4tye β 𝜎 
3 Frgshgajk2 γ 𝜎 
4 Njwklp345y α 𝜃 
5 Rnozh12p*0 β 𝜖 
6 Yajkie409@ γ 𝜙 
7 WblpAeNR%7 α 𝜙 
8 yusbr)@jkl γ 𝜃 
9 pls-2wema> β 𝜃 
10 Rtcbrtmlas α 𝜎 
The advantages of hash based indexing are: 
 It is more confidential than direct encryption based indexing [5]. 
 It allows server side evaluation of the equality condition. As an example each 
condition aij = v, where v is a constant value is transformed into a condition Iij = 
h(v), where Iij is the index corresponding to aij in the encrypted relation [5]. 
The limitations of hash based indexing are: 
 It produces spurious tuples in cases where the hash function is not collision free, 
which adds a burden to the client side [34]. 
 It is not order preserving, therefore it does not support range queries [34]. 
 It does not support the availability service. 
B + tree indexing approach 
A B+ tree can be viewed as a B-tree [39] in which each node contains only keys (not key-
value pairs), and to which an additional level is added at the bottom with linked leaves. It 
consists of leaves, internal nodes and a root. The root may be either a leaf or a node with 
two or more children. The main essence of a B+ tree is in storing data for efficient data 
processing operations [40]. 
Damiani et al. [8], propose an indexing method based on the B+ tree that can be 
attached to an encrypted database, which can be used by the server to select the data to 
be returned in response to a query without the need for disclosing the database content. 
Given an internal vertex storing f key values k1,…,kf  with f ≤ n-1, each key value 
ki is followed by a pointer pi, and k1 is preceded by a pointer p0. Pointer p0  points to the 
subtree that contains keys with values lower than k1, pf  points to the sub-tree that contains 
keys with values greater than or equal to kf, and each pi points to the sub-tree that contains 
keys with values included in the interval [ki, ki+1]. Internal vertices do not directly refer 
to tuples in the database, but just point to other vertices in the structure. Leaf vertices 
directly refer to the tuples in the database that have a specific value for the indexed 
attribute. Leaf vertices are linked in a chain that allows the efficient execution of range 
queries. 
A B+ tree is built over the most queried attribute aij of a database Di. It is then 
represented as a relational table, encrypted and stored at the server side along with the 
encrypted database [34]. The relational table consists of two attributes: 
 Id - represents the identifier of a vertex, and 
 Vertexcontent - represents the content of a vertex. 
Each row in the relation represents a vertex of the tree, while the pointers are 
represented through cross references from the vertex content to other vertex identifiers in 
the relation. Encryption is applied at the vertex level in order to protect the order 
relationship among plaintext, index values and the mapping between the two domains 
[41]. 
To search for a tuple with key k in B+ tree, the client starts searching from the 
root vertex, which is a tuple with Id = 1, retrieves it and decrypts it to see whether it 
satisfies the given condition. If not, it then traverses through the nodes, and at each node 
retrieves the content of the vertex and decrypts it until the leaf containing the key k is 
found. 
This kind of indexing approach provides both confidentiality and order 
preservation, as the outsourced data is stored encrypted with a B+ tree built over the most 
queried attribute for efficient data processing operation. However, it does not support 
availability. 
Figure 2 illustrates how this scheme is applied to the employee table (Figure 2 (a)) 
encrypted (Figure 2 (b)), the B+ tree is built over the most queried attribute of the database 
(Figure 2 (c)), it is then represented in a relational table (Figure 2 (d)), encrypted (Figure 
2 (e)) and stored along with the encrypted database at the server side. 
The advantages of the B+ tree indexing approach [34] are: 
 It supports confidentially. 
 It is secure against inference attacks, since the B+ tree content itself is encrypted. 
 It supports equality queries. 
 It is order preserving so it can support range queries. 
 It does not produce spurious tuples. 
 It allows the evaluation of ORDER-BY and GROUP-BY clauses of SQL queries. 
The limitations of the B+ tree indexing approach are: 
 B+ tree indexing is expensive for the client compared to bucket and hash based. 
Several trips (as many as the levels we have in the B+ tree) between the client and 
the server are needed to retrieve the required tuples [8]. 
 It does not support the availability service. 
  
Figure 2.  Example of the B+ tree indexing approach 
  
Order preservation encryption scheme (OPES) 
The idea behind OPES is that unique values are generated from a user specified target 
distribution and sorted in a table T. Then the ith plaintext (pi) value in the sorted list of |P| 
plaintexts is encrypted into the ith value in the sorted list of |P| values obtained from the 
user’s specified target distribution. This makes the scheme good in preserving the order 
of the encrypted data and also provides confidentiality. To decrypt any of the ciphertext 
a lookup into a reverse map is required [27]. In this case the table T is the encryption key 
that must be kept secret. 
OPES uses three stages to encrypt a database:  
 Model Stage 
 Flatten Stage and  
 Transform stage. 
Model stage:  
In this stage the input and the target distributions are modeled as piece wise linear splines 
using either of the following techniques. 
 Histogram technique: this technique captures statistical information about the data 
value distributions using counters for a specified number of data value buckets 
[42] 
 Parametric technique: this technique approximates data value distributions by 
fitting the parameters of a given type of function (e.g. polynomial of a given 
maximum degree) [42]. 
In [43], the two modeling techniques were used to first of all partition the values 
into buckets using the histogram-based technique then model the distribution within each 
bucket as a linear spline (a linear spline of a bucket is a line connecting the densities at 
the two end points of a bucket) using the parametric technique. 
Flatten stage:  
In this stage the plaintext database P is transformed into a flat database f such that values 
in f are uniformly distributed. In cases where a bucket has dense plaintext, the bucket will 
be stretched so that the density of the plaintext in the flattened bucket will be uniform. 
Transform stage:  
In this stage the flattened database is transformed into a cipher database C such that the 
values in C are distributed according to the target distribution.  
As an example, if we have pi and pj where pi < pj, this will be transformed to fi < 
fj in the flatten stage, and finally the flattened buckets will be transformed to a uniformly 
distributed cipher database ci < cj. ( i.e. Pi < Pj ⇒ fi < fj ⇒ Ci < Cj) 
In [44], an order preserving indexing scheme over encrypted data is proposed 
based on a simple mathematical expression (av + b + noise). The result of the expression 
is made public while the coefficients a and b are the secret keys known only to the data 
owner and the client. v is the value to be indexed and noise is randomly chosen from the 
range {0, …, a - 1} to preserve the order of the index. One of the limitations of this scheme 
is that the secret keys a and b are reused throughout the system, which makes the scheme 
insecure. Adding noise randomly means that even the same encrypted values may not 
have the same noise, which may give false queried information. Another limitation is 
when an attacker obtains the ciphertext c1 for plaintext zero (i.e. c1 = b + n1) and ciphertext 
c2 for large plaintext k (i.e. c2 = ak + b + n2), then by computing the difference between 
the two ciphertexts, the attacker obtains (c2 - c1 = ak + n2 - n1). Since the randomly selected 
noises n1 and n2 are between zero and a (i.e. 0 ≤ n1, n2 < a) then the attacker learns that 
the secret a is in the interval 𝐼1 =
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘+1
≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝐼2 =
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘−1
  [46, 47]. 
The advantages of the OPES indexing approach are [27]: 
 It supports the confidentiality service. 
 It is order preserving. 
 It produces exact results for the query without any spurious tuples. 
 It can handle updates, without the need for re-encryption. 
The limitations of the OPES indexing approach are: 
 It is vulnerable to tight estimation and statistical attacks [45]. 
 It is vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks [45]. 
 It does not support availability. 
Information dispersal algorithms (IDAs) 
IDAs were first proposed by Michael O. Rabin in 1989 to protect data sent over the 
network or sitting in storage arrays and not to be accessed except by the right user [48]. 
In IDAs, a file is split into n pieces where a minimum m pieces (n > m) are 
required for reconstructing the original file. A transform matrix of n rows and m columns 
is used to transform the original file into n pieces [47]. 
In a salted IDA, confidentiality is achieved by using a modified IDA scheme. A 
salted IDA depends on randomness to improve data confidentiality. While it relies on the 
original IDA scheme to provide data availability [50]. 
A transform matrix TM of (n x m) is maintained by the client as the information 
dispersal matrix and the keys for encoding and decoding a data matrix D. n and m are 
determined by the client based on the number of servers that are planned to be used and 
the estimated number of non-faulty (available) servers. Also the client keeps a secret ss 
(a shared secret between the data owner and client) and a deterministic function fs for 
producing random factors (called salts) based on the address of the data entries on D. 
Function fs feeds ss and the address of the data entry into a pseudorandom number 
generator (PRNG) before encoding and dispersing D onto the servers, for each column i 
of D the client calls the PRNG procedure i times, sets the last generated random number 
(the output of the ith round) as the salt to each data entry of column i. The data matrix 
after adding the salt is called a tuple matrix TD. The essence of the generated random 
number was to improve the confidentiality of the original IDA. 
It is difficult to search for data in an encoded matrix based on plaintext input. To 
solve this issue, a B+ tree index was built on the key attribute and kept secured at the 
client side. The leaf nodes of the index tree contain pointers to the columns of the tuple 
matrix (TD) where the tuple with its key are stored.  
The Index matrix (ID) and TD are encoded into IE = (ID × TM) and TE = (TD × 
TM) respectively and then dispersed onto n servers, S1, S2, ..., Sn, by the salted IDA as 
shown in Figure 3. Queries on the index key attribute can be efficiently processed by 
locating the columns of ID (tree nodes) that store the query keys and then retrieving the 
corresponding tuples from the columns of TD. 
After decoding the encoded data retrieved from m non-faulty servers, the client 
reconstructs the salts by calling fs and then deducts these salts from the decoded data 
entries, recovering D. 
 Figure 3: Framework for dispersing data in a cloud using salts [50] 
The advantages of the IDA are [50]: 
 It provides a confidentiality service. 
 It supports equality queries. 
 It is order preserving, and as such it supports range queries. 
 It supports availability. 
 It does not produce spurious tuples. 
 It is secured against statistical analysis of the encrypted data. 
The limitations of the IDA are [50]: 
 For every query the whole column where the candidate answer tuple is located 
has to be retrieved. 
 It is expensive for the client. 
Table 3 compares the reviewed approaches in the literature based on six criteria: 
support for equality queries and/or range queries, the cost of performing operations at the 
client side, returning spurious tuples, data availability and data confidentiality. It is 
obvious that none of the aforementioned approaches are able to adequately address all the 
data outsourcing issues. Every approach has some limitations. This motivates us to 
propose a new data outsourcing scheme that tries to address all the issues. 
Table 3: Comparison of the existing approaches 
Approaches 
Equality 
Queries 
Range 
Queries 
Client 
Burden 
Spurious 
Tuples 
Availability Confidentiality 
Encryption based indexing Fully No High Yes No Yes 
Homomorphic encryption Fully No High Yes No Yes 
Partitioned based indexing Fully Partially Partially Yes No Yes 
Hash based indexing Fully No High Yes No Yes 
B+ tree indexing Fully Yes High No No Yes 
Order preservation encryption Fully Fully High No No Yes 
IDAs Fully Fully High No Yes Yes 
A secret sharing scheme using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) 
A secret sharing algorithm is one of the prominent techniques widely used in data 
outsourcing [3, 15, 29, 55]. It is an ideal scheme for storing sensitive and highly important 
information. Traditional encryption methods, as discussed earlier, are not efficient for 
achieving a high level of confidentiality and availability at the same time. 
The aim of this paper is to explore a secret sharing algorithm based on the Chinese 
Reminder Theorem (CRT) to provide data availability, confidentiality and order 
preservation for outsourced data. 
The secret sharing scheme based on CRT produces shares presented in 
congruence equations and the secret can be recovered by solving the system of 
congruencies to get a unique solution, which is the original outsourced data. Secret 
sharing schemes that are based on CRT are proved by Quisquater et el [49] to be 
asymptotically perfect schemes [51]. 
CRT Theorem: 
Suppose that m1, m2, …, mk are pairwise relatively prime positive integers. Then for any 
given integers a1, a2, …, ak, the following system of simultaneous congruencies 
x ≡ ai (mod mi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k 
has a unique solution x modulo the product M = m1…mk. 
This is given by: 
x ≡ a1M1y1 + a2M2y2 + …+ akMkyk(modM) 
where 𝑀𝑖 =
𝑀
𝑚𝑖
    and yi ≡ (Mi)-1(mod mi) 
Asmuth-Bloom threshold scheme 
Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing is a threshold scheme that is based on CRT. It was 
proposed with the intent of safeguarding a key [34]. In this scheme, a key K is 
decomposed into n shares Ii (congruence classes of a number associated with the original 
key), in such a way that the key is only recoverable from any r ≤ n of the shares, and no 
useful information can be recovered from (r - 1) shares. 
The value of this scheme depends on the following features [34]: 
 the efficiency of decomposition and recoverability of the key, 
 the sensitivity of the method to random error or deliberate tempering, 
 the relationship between the number of shares (n), the minimum number of shares 
required to recover the secret (r) and the number of shares that is not enough to 
recover the secret (r - 1). 
The Asmuth-Bloom threshold scheme consists of two phases [52]: 
 Environmental formation phase 
 Secret recovery phase. 
Environmental formation phase:  
This phase consists of two stages:  
Initialization stage: In this stage, a set of integers {p, m1, m2, …, mn} are chosen 
subject to the following conditions: 
 m1 < m2 < … < mn 
 gcd(mi, mj) = 1 for i ≠ j 
 gcd(p, mi) = 1 for all i 
 ∏ mi
r
i=1 > 𝑝 ∏ mn−i+1
r−1
i=1  
 p > K 
Decomposition stage: In this stage, the decomposition process goes as follows: 
 compute  M = ∏ 𝑚𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=1  
 compute the parameter I = K + β.p, where 0 ≤ I < M and β is an arbitrary integer 
chosen from the range [0,
𝑀
𝑃
− 1] 
 then decompose the Key using Ii ≡ K(mod mi) and share it to the users with the ith 
user having the Ii share where 1 ≤ i ≤ n 
Secret recovery phase: 
Suppose we have a system of congruencies Ii ≡ K (mod mi). The secret K can be uniquely 
recovered using a constructive algorithm as follows [53]: 
 compute the product of the r primes that are required to recover the secret as 
M=m1m2…mr 
 for each prime compute 𝑀𝑖 =
𝑀
𝑚𝑖
  
 use an Extended Euclidean Algorithm to find the integers αi and γi such that: 
αi.mi + γi (M/mi) = 1 
Let ei = γi (M / mi) ⇒ αi.mi + ei = 1 
ei in the above equation guarantees that its remainder when divided by mi must be 
1, i.e. ei ≡ 1(mod mi) 
Hence, the system of congruencies has one solution that is 𝐾 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑒𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=0  based 
on CRT. Shares construction in the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme has a 
complexity of Olog(r) [49]. 
The Asmuth-Bloom scheme can be modified to provide a validity check and a 
deliberate tempering of the shares. To make the scheme perform a validity check to the 
shares of the key, the second condition of the initialization stage has to be weakened to 
allow gcd(mi, mj ) = qij where qij ≠ 1. As an example if Ii and Ij are known and gcd(mi, mj) 
= qij, then for the correct shares Ii ≡ Ij (mod qij). 
If there is an error in Ii, this will alter its congruencies class modulo all of the qij, 
therefore the error free shares would be in general agreement with each other and those 
in error can be discarded [32]. 
Direct implementation of Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing schema in data 
outsourcing 
This section proposes a new data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom 
threshold secret sharing. It consists of three stages: 
Setup: 
In this stage the data owner performs the following steps: 
 choose a set of prime integers {p, m1, m2, …, mn} based on the following 
conditions: 
o p  >  di : di represents a single attribute value  
o m1 < m2 < … < mn, where n is the number of DSP 
o gcd(mi, mj) = 1 for i ≠ j 
o gcd(p, mj) = 1 for all j 
o ∏ mj
r
j=1 > 𝑝 ∏ mn−j+1
r−1
j=1  
 choose a random integer β ϵ [0,
𝑀
𝑃
− 1] and compute Ii = di + β.p for each data 
value (di) of the attribute to be used as an index for the outsourced database. 
Outsourcing: 
To distribute the database to multiple DSP servers, the data owner performs the following 
step: 
 compute 𝐼𝑗
′ values for each Ii as the following 𝐼𝑗
′ ≡ 𝐼𝑖(𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑚𝑗) and then distribute 
them to n service providers along with the encrypted database. 
The essence of each 𝐼𝑗
′ value is to serve as an order-preserving index for the 
encrypted database outsourced to the jth server. 
Retrieving: 
To retrieve the outsourced encrypted data, the server uses the modulus as an index to 
retrieve the encrypted data and decrypt it at the client side. 
The example below illustrates how this scheme can be used to build an index on 
the salary attribute of the employee database (Table 1). Assume the data owner needs to 
outsource the database of his/her employees to five different service providers (DSPj). 
Let m1=101, m2=103, m3=107, m4=109, m5=111, p=45, β=3. 
 Compute Ii = di + β.p as shown in Table 4 column 3 
 Then the salary can be shared using 𝐼𝑗
′ ≡ 𝐼𝑖(𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑚𝑗) as shown in Table 4 
columns (4-8) 
Table 4: Indexes of the employee’s Database to each DSP. 
S/N 
Salary 
(di) 
Ii 
Server 1 
Ii (mod 101) 
Server 2 
Ii (mod 103) 
Server 3 
Ii (mod 107) 
Server 4 
Ii (mod 109) 
Server 5 
Ii (mod 111) 
1 10 145 44 42 38 36 34 
2 18 153 52 50 46 44 42 
3 21 156 55 53 49 47 45 
4 36 171 70 68 64 62 60 
5 67 202 0 99 95 93 91 
6 69 204 2 101 97 95 93 
7 71 206 4 0 99 97 95 
8 81 216 14 10 97 107 105 
9 93 228 26 22 2 10 6 
10 238 373 70 64 52 46 40 
In the previous works, we can see that outsourcing by encrypting the whole data 
without building order-preserving indexes is prohibitive in terms of performance and does 
not solve the problem of availability. In contrast, ABSS can be used to create n shares 
and distribute it to different service providers as shown in Table 4. We can use these 
shares as indexes in various DSPs in order to achieve the following advantages: 
 Partially preserve the order of the outsourced data (when di < p) to support range 
queries. 
 Support equality queries. 
 Reduce the computational cost of encryption. 
 Reduce the burden of encrypting and decrypting on the client when making a 
query. 
From Figure 4, we can extract the limitations of the direct implementation to this 
scheme as follows: 
 from an employee with id = 1 to that with id = 4, the order of the index was 
preserved because the salaries are less than the chosen prime p = 45. But when 
Max(di) > P the order cannot be preserved over all the attribute values. Thus 
queries can produce spurious tuples. As an example, employees with id = 4 and 
id = 10 have the same index. 
 By statistical analysis of the outsourced modulus values, an adversary can obtain 
the primes. For example, in Server 2 and Server 3, the highest moduli numbers 
are 101 and 107 respectively before it wraps around. Those values are very close 
to (m2 = 103) and (m3 = 109) values. 
 
Figure 4: Index of employees’ database in DSP1. 
Due to the issues raised in the direct implementation of ABSS in data outsourcing, 
the next section proposed an enhanced data outsourcing model based on ABSS that 
mitigates the aforementioned issues of direct implementation. 
Enhanced data outsourcing model based on Asmuth-Bloom scheme 
In this section, we have enhanced the direct implementation of Asmuth Bloom secret 
sharing to counteract its security threats. The enhanced scheme involves the following 
stages: 
Setup: 
In this stage the data owner initializes the data outsourcing environment through the 
following steps: 
 choose an increasing polynomial function f(di) (a function applied on the attribute 
values (di)) in which the variable is the attribute values to be outsourced and the 
coefficients are secrets to be selected by the data owner and shared with the client. 
Without loss of generality let us assume a degree 2 polynomial function of the 
following form:  
𝑓(𝑑𝑖) = 𝑎𝑑𝑖
2 + 𝑏𝑑𝑖
1 + 𝑐    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 > 0 
The above polynomial equation can have one positive and one negative root as 
there is single change of sign (𝑓(𝑑𝑖) − 𝑎𝑑𝑖
2 − 𝑏𝑑𝑖
1 − 𝑐 = 0) which determines the 
number of positive roots that exist [54]. If the outsourced data contains single 
signed values (either positive or negative), the client can easily choose the correct 
root value when it solves the equation. However, in case the outsourced data 
contains both positive and negative values, we need to apply a scaling factor to 
make sure all the data values are of the same sign. The scale factor serves as an 
additional secret shared between the client and data owner. As an example if the 
expected data range is [-10, 25] then we can add a scaling factor ≥ 10 to have a 
new range of values that are all positive. If the scaling factor is selected as 10 then 
the new range will be [0, 35]. 
 choose a set of prime integers {p, m1, m2, …, mn} such that : 
o mj <  min(f(di)) 
o m1 < m2 < … < mn, where n is the number of DSP 
o p << m1 
o gcd(mi, mj) =1 for i ≠ j 
o gcd(p,mj)=1 for all j 
o ∏ mj
r
j=1 > 𝑝 ∏ mn−j+1
r−1
j=1  
 choose a random integer β ϵ [0,
𝑀
𝑃
− 1] and compute Ii = f(di) + β.p for each 
attribute value di, where  𝑀 = ∏ mj
r
j=1  
Outsourcing: 
To distribute the database to multiple DSP servers, the data owner performs the following 
steps: 
 compute the quotients qi = Ii div mj and the modulus  𝐼𝑗
′ ≡ 𝐼𝑖(𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑚𝑗) for all the 
attribute values, 
 encrypt the modulus  𝐼𝑗
′ and store it with the unencrypted quotient qi. 
The essence of the introduced polynomial function f is to enhance system security 
as the coefficients are extra secrets known only to the data owner and the client. It is also 
used to enlarge the data to give a chance of selecting large co-prime integers mj. 
The quotient of the data is used as an index to maintain the order of the stored 
information at the server side, which will consequently help in supporting spurious-less 
range queries. The modulus is encrypted to keep the data secured as (mj)s are selected big 
enough to make the quotient alone not sufficient to estimate the actual data. 
Selecting large co-primes also helps in enhancing security because it increases the 
range that the modulus can take before it wraps around and thus reduces the chance of 
the adversary obtaining the modulus even in an unencrypted form. 
Retrieving: 
To retrieve the outsourced data the client performs the following steps: 
 convert the queried data value into n quotient based query 
 retrieve the correspondent tuples from at least r servers (r is the minimum number 
of servers out of which we can reconstruct the shared data) and decrypt the 
retrieved modulus  
 use the following constructive algorithm to obtain Ii 
𝐼𝑖 = ∑ 𝐼𝑗
′. 𝑒𝑗
𝑟
𝑗=1
 
where 𝑒𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗 (
𝑀
𝑚𝑗
) is computed by the Extended Euclidean Algorithm out of αj.mj 
+ ei = 1  
 compute the value Ii in mod ∏ 𝑚𝑗 
𝑟
𝑗=1  
 subtract the value β.p from Ii to obtain f(di) 
 solve the polynomial equation to obtain di. 
Let us illustrate how the scheme can be applied on the Employees table (Table 1). 
Setup: 
 let f(di) = adi2 + bdi + c: the coefficients a=2, b=1 and c=1  as shown in Table 5 
 let p = 45, m1 =101, m2 = 103, m3 = 107, m4 =109, m5 =111 
 let β=3 
 compute Ii = f(di) + β.p for each attribute value di as shown in Table 5 
Table 5: Environmental Set up 
S/N Salary (di) f(di) = adi2 + bdi + c Ii = f(di)+β.p 
1 10 211 346 
2 18 667 802 
3 21 904 1039 
4 36 2629 2764 
5 67 9046 9181 
6 69 9592 9727 
7 71 10154 10289 
8 81 13204 13339 
9 93 17392 17527 
10 238 113527 113662 
Outsourcing: 
 compute the quotients qi and modulus for each di 
 encrypt the modulus and disperse it to the servers as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Indexing scheme using a quotient of the outsourced data 
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4 Server 5 
Index E(Ii mod 101) Index E(Ii mod 103) Index E(Ii mod 107) Index E(Ii mod 109) Index E(Ii mod 111) 
3 #1anv,yuw 3 %1anghyuw 3 L?]ojub 3 Poknv$9 3 byyttt7 
7 $89b5dja% 7 239b5dja% 7 P,mvs3# 7 Pomnbgfd3 7 Bbyughik 
10 *s(1mfk3} 10 lkj6mfkdf 9 “;kubdu 9 “lkkmhgtui 9 hyt}x#4 
27 =s(1gkk3} 26 hdgkdgdg 25 Pomngfa 2 (mkkjj”,?. 24 Buu46”p 
90 [79b5sjq% 89 ty9fgsjqy 85 “lkjhf5 84 {dfrt5789 82 Yyggggg# 
96 q@medh6 94 m.pmedhp 90 Piknhg6 89 q@medh6 87 Niiinioii* 
101 s?dcms#th 99 =rtcmsm., 96 ‘p”hggff 94 ,mngfswaw 92 yhyygg@g 
132 @12hz+ef 129 asd2hzlm 124 Yunhzkjh 122 ,kn gerxwxt 120 Ij%hhii” 
173 Xbs&whw 170 SDbs&mne 163 ybsl./op 160 SF43455n 157 5nhjhdd 
1125 Zxc!u!inm0 1103 RTN!u908u 1062 lkhu!ipoi 1042 Mhgfdc4k’ 1023 Kuy6789 
Retrieving: 
To illustrate how this scheme can be used to retrieve outsourced data from the server, an 
example query to Table 6 for the salary d1 = 10 is used. 
 the client converts the query into an index corresponding to each server. Assume 
that out of the five servers only Server 1 (m1 = 101), Server 2 (m2 = 103) and Server 
3 (m3 = 107) respond to the request. The client therefore: 
 retrieves the encrypted moduli and decrypts them, 
 uses a constructive algorithm to compute I1 = ∑ 𝐼𝑗
′. 𝑒𝑗
3
𝑗=1  where e1, e2 and e3 are 
obtained using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm such that: 
gcd(m1, (m2 × m3)) = 4583(101) - 42(11021) ⇒ e1 = -42(11021) 
gcd(m2, (m1 × m3)) = 1364(103) - 13(10807) ⇒ e2 = -13(10807) 
gcd(m3, (m1 × m2)) = 4764(107) - 49(10403) ⇒ e3 = - 49(10403) 
this yields I1 = 43.e1 + 37.e2 + 25.e3 = -37845768 
 computes I1 in mod ∏ 𝑚𝑗
3
𝑗=1  ⇒ I1 = -37845768 mod (101×103×107) = 346 
 I1 = f(d1) + β.p ⇒ f(d1) = I1 - β.p ⇒ f(d1) = 346 - 3 × 45 = 211. 
 solves the equation (2d12 + d1 + 1 = 211) to obtain d1 ⇒ d1 = 10 or d1 = -10.5 
Table 7 shows the same criteria as Table 3. It can be seen that the proposed scheme 
satisfies all criteria. It is more efficient compared to the previously reviewed ones in that 
it can jointly support equality and range queries, guarantees less burden on the client 
compared to some of previous approaches such as B+ tree indexing, produces no spurious 
tuples and also provides data availability and confidentiality. 
Although IDA addresses many of the data outsourcing issues as shown in Table 
3, however, the shares of IDA contain part of the original data that can be of use to a third 
party [33]. By snooping, an eavesdropper who obtains fewer than the threshold shares 
may reconstruct some part of the original data explicitly resulting in partial data leakage 
[56]. In contrast, no single share in the proposed approach can reveal information about 
the original data. Moreover, IDA places extra burden on the client side since it uses the 
B+ tree, which demands a lot of trips between the server and the client. This makes it less 
efficient compared to the proposed approach. Thus, the proposed Asmuth-Bloom secret 
sharing data outsourcing scheme provides more confidentiality and better performance 
when compared to IDA. 
Table 7: Analysis parameters of the proposed scheme  
 
Equality 
Queries 
Range 
Queries 
Client Burden 
Spurious 
Tuples 
Availability Confidentiality 
Secure Data Outsourcing 
Scheme Based On Asmuth-
Bloom Secret Sharing 
Fully Fully Low No Yes Yes 
Security analysis 
This section discusses different attack scenarios that can be launched successfully against 
some of the reviewed schemes. Then it shows how the proposed scheme is secured against 
such attacks. 
Scenario 1: 
An attacker succeeds in launching a Denial of Service attack against one or two of the 
servers involved in the outsourcing service. He/she cannot cripple the overall system, as 
only r out of the n servers are required to retrieve the outsourced data, and not all of them. 
Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against a DoS attack to a few of the servers and can 
maintain service availability. 
Scenario 2: 
An internal/external attacker might try to gain knowledge of the secrets (primes) by 
launching an inference attack, as the modulus values may expose the range of the secrets. 
However, the proposed scheme is secured against such attacks, since the modulus values 
are stored encrypted at the server side to preserve the confidentiality of the outsourced 
data. 
Scenario 3: 
An attacker succeeds in obtaining the order-preserved indexes of the outsourced data. 
Even so, he/she cannot gain any kind of knowledge about the original outsourced data 
since these indexes were obtained as a result of a function applied on the original attribute 
values. The coefficients of this function are shared secrets between the data owner and 
the client only. Thus, the proposed scheme preserves the order of the outsourced data 
without revealing information about the original data. 
Scenario 4: 
An adversary might try to obtain the indexes and the modulus values of different tuples 
from the same server, or the modulus values of the same tuple from different servers, in 
order to form linear equations that can be solved simultaneously so as to reveal the 
outsourced data. This kind of attack is not feasible in the proposed scheme as the modulus 
values are stored encrypted. 
Scenario 5: 
If an adversary, in scenario 4, has further succeeded in obtaining the unencrypted modulus 
values, he/she is still going to have more unknowns (the outsourced data and the scheme’s 
primes) than the number of equations that he/she can form. Therefore, it will be 
computationally infeasible to get a deterministic solution.  
Conclusion 
Data outsourcing is a new paradigm that has gained a high popularity recently but it is 
hindered by some security challenges from gaining wide spread acceptance. The security 
challenges include: data confidentiality, availability and order preservation of the 
outsourced data. Data confidentiality is mostly achieved using a traditional encryption 
scheme, but traditional encryption is not good in preserving the order of the outsourced 
data, which is an important property that is needed in data outsourcing. Availability is 
another issue as the data loss can affect the business of the data owner. Data availability 
is usually achieved by duplicating the data and storing it at different servers. 
This paper analyses some of the previous work in data outsourcing, and shows the 
advantages and limitations of each. It then proposes a secure data outsourcing scheme 
based on Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing, which uses congruence classes and the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem to solve the aforementioned issues. Firstly, we proposed a direct 
implementation of this scheme that consists of three stages: setup, outsourcing and 
retrieving. In the setup stage the data owner chooses a set of prime integers known only 
to him/her and his/her client; in the data outsourcing stage the data owner outsources the 
encrypted attribute values and its modulus, where the modulus is used as an index. In the 
retrieving stage the client uses the index to retrieve the encrypted data and decrypt it at 
the client side. However, the direct implementation is expensive for the client as it 
produces spurious tuples. It is also vulnerable to statistical analysis attacks that can expose 
the used secret primes. 
Finally, an enhanced scheme is proposed that also consists of three stages. In the 
setup stage, an increasing polynomial function is introduced to enlarge the attribute 
values. This allows larger co-prime integers to be selected so as to increase the modulus 
range before it wraps around, thus reducing the chance of an adversary obtaining the 
modulus value even in an unencrypted form. In the outsourcing stage, the data owner 
outsources the encrypted modulus and the quotient of the attribute values, to various 
servers for availability. The quotient is used as an index to keep the order of the 
outsourced encrypted modulus. To retrieve any value, the client retrieves the encrypted 
values, decrypts them and constructs the modulus using the CRT constructive algorithm. 
The proposed scheme is computationally efficient as it uses simple modular 
arithmetic. It is more secure as the index is generated after wrapping the outsourced data 
by a polynomial function whose coefficients are kept secret. It also produces no spurious 
tuples and provides availability and confidentiality. In addition, it is an order-preserving 
scheme, which further reduces the burden of encryption and decryption of every query. 
Because of all its properties, the proposed scheme is strongly recommended as an efficient 
tool for real data outsourcing scenarios. 
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